

THE HISTORY OF THE

1744


ENQUIRY, &c.

OF THE

(Price One Shilling.)

Pryme d. 474

A N
E N Q U I R Y
I N T O T H E
P R E S E N T S Y S T E M.



L O N D O N:

Printed for A. and C. CORBETT, at their *Correct*
State-Lottery-Office over-against St. Dunstan's
Church, *Fleetstreet*.


M.DCC.LVI.

AN

ENQUIRY

INTO THE

PRESSENT SYSTEM.



'84.3517

LONDON:

Printed for A. and C. CORBETT at their Office
in the Strand, opposite the Theatre Royal, Drury Lane.
Church, Strand.

M.DCCC.LVI.



A N

ENQUIRY, &c.

IT is very natural when any Thing happens extraordinary, that thinking Men at once enquire into the Cause, and thence form the best Judgment they are able of the probable Consequences; and as few are so defective in Judgment as not to perceive that the present War is likely to be as warm as expensive, neither are they so indolently incurious as not to desire as clear Intelligence as may be whence our Complaints originally spring, what are the present Grounds of the War, and what the Means, either by internal Wealth or external Alliances, to carry it on with Success, and to conclude it with Honour. But as this is not to be explained and thoroughly understood without waving all

all partial Prejudices, it may be extremely necessary, before we enter into the Heart of this System, to say so much on the Nature of our Trade, as may lead us regularly into a right Consideration of the Subject. For however Men use, or apply particular Expressions, or speak of War as the Effect of meer Disputes upon Matters of Honour or Interest between the respective Courts, the Source of all the Calamities which are naturally consequent of a War, is in the Injuries done, or supposed to be done us in respect to Trade, in which we thrive and flourish, or fade and decay, as any other Nation happens to interrupt, bad Conduct misleads us, or as Wisdom, and an uninterrupted Series of Peace smiles on, and blesses our happy Endeavours.

It is hence to be reasonably concluded, that War should be purely deduced from Violence committed against us to the Prejudice of our Trade, and not from want of Industry or Virtue in ourselves; whence our attentive Neighbours will always draw a suitable Advantage, and which we cannot reasonably resent, however it may give us Pain, because this is only the same Game that domestic Traders play upon one another, to which all Mankind have an equal Right; and the worst Name I ever knew given it by wise Men is *Emulation*, and *Emulation* has always been esteemed a Virtue, where the Principles by which it acts are morally just; and I think a laudable Industry has never been otherwise noted. Therefore our first Enquiry is, what

what have heretofore been the real Motives, and what the true Cause of the present War; for as we are to suppose that our former and present Systems are intimately connected, and that War is rarely the Effect of particular Accidents, but of long latent Evils, under which the Nation has groaned; so when it breaks out, the Cause must be looked for much farther back, than common Recollection seems to conceive. In which Light we must turn our Thoughts to Causes more remote; and if we find that we have heretofore engaged in a War on fair Principles, and that owing to some Fatalities alike common to all Nations at different Times, we did not procure the requisite Satisfaction we might justly think ourselves entitled to, the same still remains to be acquired whenever a proper Opportunity presents.

This is the common Policy of all Nations, and how far right is not in my present Road to discuss; but it is, that we should seriously consider, whether a first War was upon just Principles, before our Defeats in that should lay the Foundation of a second, otherwise even Success will hardly justify us in the Eye of the World; and if we fail, are in a fair Way of being undone.

I know not how far these sober Reflections may affect the Prejudiced, or those whose Imaginations are too much heated for Reasoning; but as it is not for the present Instant that I am writing, let them

them when they become cooler remember, that the Nation will not be always obliged to support Measures that cannot be decently justified, and how far the present are such, is now to be considered.

The Root of our Commerce are the staple Manufactures of the Nation, resulting from the Products of our Lands, and from raw Exotics; and as whatever of these compounded, or form'd into saleable Merchandise are vended abroad, will be for the Benefit of the Nation, so will that Benefit rise or decay, as our exported Manufactures are kept up to a certain and invariable Staple. On the contrary, if we fail herein, and any other Nation pushing at the same Point, shall wisely pursue different Measures, our engaging in a War for that Reason, will neither retrieve our own Credit, nor ruin theirs; nor, therefore, can the Protection of a Government be of any Advantage, nor ought a Ministry to interest themselves therein, lest they make that a national, which is only a private Concern, and the whole Community charge themselves with Crimes committed by Individuals.

But it is both necessary and right for Power to interfere when we are insulted and injured; and so it is, when by bad Practices Men insult the Laws, and injure the Community, as they are much the worse Enemies of any State; yet these are they who most usually complain of the Negligence or Indolence of their Rulers, and clamour loudly for Justice

stice against their Neighbours, because they are evidently honefter than themselves.

We feem, in two Points efpecially, by meer finifter Conduct, to have given up our Intereft to *France*, in the *Sugar*, and in the *Cloathing* Trades; in the former, to make fome few Planters immenfely rich; and, in the latter, to make the Master Clothiers eminent. The Conduct of the one has reduced Sugar to a meer domeftic Commodity; the other ruined the beft Cloth Trade we had, and both angry at the *French* for having acquired them.

The *Clothiers*, indeed, have not engaged the Public in any Difficulties on their account; they are only blamed for not keeping up to their Standard, and preferving the Credit of the Market in foreign Countries, which is thereby thrown into the Hands of the *French*.

The Sugar Planters do not vitiate the Commodity, but expect double the Price of their Neighbours at foreign Markets; but as their Conduct is idle, fo their Expectations are vain.

It is remarkable in both, that Sugar in *England*, for fome Years paft, has been twice the Price it was twenty Years ago; and that Cloth is one fourth worfe in the Staple, and one fourth dearer; under which unhappy Circumftances the Clothier complains, that he can't go on; and the Planter, that Sugar is not worth cultivating;—fo that it is truly pro-

problematic how this has been conducted for a Century past, and how the *French* manage so much cheaper now.

In the Clothing, it has occasioned a very whimsical Alteration in the Course of Commere, by turning the *Persian* Trade through *RUSSIA*, as it was formerly through the *Grand Signior's* Dominions; but as the Effects are not yet apparent, I shall not attempt to prophesy on the Subject. My Remark is only, that had those, concerned in the *Turky* Trade, whether Clothier, Factor, or Merchant, been honest, the Alteration had never taken Place: But, wherever this Trade is carried on, if Dependance is not to be had on the Mark of the Manufacturer, the Event will only be, to open a Trade for other People, as we have done in *Turky*, *India*, &c.

The Sugar Trade, I think, cost us between the Years 1740 and 50, about Fifty Millions Sterling; and the Interest we obtain for our Money, is to have the Price doubled upon us. I say, cost us so much, as that was the Foundation of the late War; and I much question, whether all our Sugar Islands together would sell, even to the *French*, for a quarter of the Expence, or do ever produce an adequate Balance in our Favour.

Now the Complaint is, that the *French* run away with all our Trade; but I am afraid, that they first

ran away with all our Virtue, as without the one, the other had never happened. We do not allow them to be more *wise*, more *skilful*, or more *industrious* than ourselves, neither do they beat us out of our Trade, as the *Dutch* have done formerly, by Violence. The Point then is, what we quarrel with them about : For, it is plain, they either get our Trade from us, or they do not. If they do, then the Enquiry is, by what Means ? If not, then whence spring our Complaints ? In common Life, if a Tradesman loses his Customers, and they go to another, it is reasonably concluded against him, that it is owing to Ignorance, Negligence, or Dishonesty ; but no Reflection falls on those who entertain and serve such Customers. What one loses by some Defect, another gains by his Skill ; and thus is Commerce circulated and supported, and becomes thereby a common Benefit to Mankind, tho' more immediately so to those capitally interested, yet affects the whole World in Consequence. I say, then, if we have no other Quarrel with *France*, than what this Subject affords Occasion for, we only go to War to recover, by Violence, what we lose by bad Conduct, and set the whole State on the Adventure of a Die, by engaging with an Adversary, at least equally potent.

The Remark on this, usually is, that the more we tamely permit the *French* to gain, the more they will encroach. This is agreed to be the Case of all Nations which have Acquisition in View : But the Question only is, What is the most natural and rational

tional Means of preventing their Attainment of such Acquisition? what the best Conduct for a moral People to pursue? It is hardly to be doubted, but they should seek Success in Diligence and Industry, the Means in common Life by which Men gain upon one another; and it is the same between Nation and Nation.

I remember the Time when the *French* Traders in *Turky* could only deal with as eminent Thieves as themselves, the strolling Pedlars of that Country, *Armenians*, *Cophits*, and *Jews*; when every Month brought on a fresh Bankruptcy in *Marseilles*; and when a wise Minister told them, in answer to their Complaints, That the first Principle of Trade was Honesty, and by that only they were to gain upon the *English*: They took the Hint, found it their Interest, and succeeded. As they improved by their new Conduct, we gradually imbibed their old; and I need not tell the rest.

This Fatality of the Times at home, abroad, and in various other Trades, has its Source in a particular Habit amongst us, as making it a Point of absolute Necessity to be suddenly rich: Patience, the great Virtue of our Forefathers, being not equally in Esteem. Thus every Man must be a Master, and though he set up with a Trifle, finds it necessary to be at the Head, before well seated at the Bottom. The Manufacturer sees with Envy the Figure the Tradesman cuts, and follows the illaudable Example; but as necessary Measures must be pursued, the Trader requires a cheaper, the Ma-

manufacturer makes a slighter Commodity. The Event needs no Explanation. The Merchants are deceived, the Factors here lose their Commissions, and the Manufacturer, in the End, his Custom; but he has, perhaps, done enough, made his own Fortune, and ruined the Trade; when, in Defence of himself, he tells the People, that the *French* have run away with it.

He states his Case thus: Our Staple is firm, strong and durable; that of the *French* slight, shewy, and superficial; and as Goods so manufactured can be afforded cheaper, so they gain in Proportion on us in foreign Markets. He concludes, we therefore must make ours equally slight.

This is very true; but the Question is, Whether they should be made equally slight, as the *French*, with the *old Standard* Mark, and Price of the *English*? That this is the present Measure of managing the Woollen Manufactures, is but too glaring, from what is constantly before our Eyes, as any Superfines of the old Fabricks are rarely to be found. They are now nearly reduced to the *French* Standard of manufacturing, and yet the Market Price higher than formerly; and what is still worse, that Part of the Law unexecuted, which restrains from stretching on the Tenters, which still adds materially to the Profit, at the Expence of the Reputation of the Fabrick.

This somewhat resembles the Conduct of the Vintners and Victuallers, Wine in the Bottle, or Beer in
C the

the Tankard, are shortened in the Measure, to pay Charges of Bottling, and Interest of Plate; and the woollen Goods are stretched, to answer some equally important Contingency, in which the Injury at home is nothing comparable to the evil Effects it produces abroad. A single Inch stretch'd in a Yard, answers great Profit to the Manufacturer, but ruins a Suit of Cloaths effectually; so that for the Manufacturer's gaining about Sixpence in the Yard, the Purchaser, including contingent Expences, is injured Six or Seven Pounds; and if the same Trade is carried on abroad, the like Reflection must naturally follow, and the Consequence must be, the throwing the Trade open to our Rivals.

I have been more particular as to one Specie of our Manufactures, because it is that wherein the *French* may, and do, more materially harm us; while it is not to be supposed, that, if we behave thus idly in respect to our finer, that we are more attentive to our true Interest in respect to the coarser Manufactures; but what is worse, evil Examples are apt to spread; and the Nack of Cheating once in Fashion, by Degrees affect more than one Particular; but a single Remark is sufficient to prove the Point in View, that the *Opulence* of a Nation essentially depends on the *Virtue* of the People.

When the Manufacturers are asked, why they do Things so contrary to Rectitude and common Sense, their Answer is ready, That the Factors and Drapers beat down their Prices, and therefore they must

must do so, or starve. To me it seems immaterial where the Fault lies; but it is very evident where it should be rectified; because, if a very strict Inspection were made, bad Fabrications could not be had at any Price; nor, were proper Measures taken, could either the Manufacturer slight his Work, or the Factor be benefited; and as the Merchant is only supposed to deal upon Honour, let the Penalty, whatever it may be, rest on the Factor; and then, if not in Collusion, let him have a double Remedy over-against the Manufacturer.

If any penal Statutes are good, they are more particularly so in this Case; as for want of due Care it may be, and is in the Power of a few to ruin the Trade of a Nation; and these the very People that begin the Outcry, and set us at Variance with our Neighbours on false Principles.

It is a trite Thing to say, that Credit is the support of Trade: every Trader knows this to be true; and they must at the same Time know that all the great Things we have done in Commerce, is owing thereto: It will follow, that when the Principle that gave Commerce Birth, and raised it to a flourishing State is deviated from, that the Consequence is too evident to need Illustration; and if this be owing to the sinister Views of some Individuals, the Remedy seems very obvious.

That the *French* work hard against us is true, and are therein highly commendable, and ought to be

so in our Eyes, as they only thereby call upon us to exert a laudable Emulation, and honestly to shew which Nation has the best natural, or acquired Talents, which most industrious and Praise worthy. This one would think should awake the *British* Spirit to Fame and Renown, in the propagating of peaceful Arts; a Principle much more to be applauded than Skill in the Art of War, and the plundering of industrious Men, however their Vanity or Folly may, in other Respects, make them our Enemies.

The Glory of *Rome* was founded in Violence; but even there, Success had its Root in private Virtue. The Principle they set out with, they proceeded upon, until the Attainment of Fame's utmost Summit; in which Exaltation they lost Sight of what gave Being to their Elevation, grew giddy, and down they fell again.

Here it may be well remarked, that if, as a trading Nation, we cannot rise by peaceful Arts, by Emulation, Industry and Honesty, neither can we rise by War; like desperate People, we may shift from one Resource to another, but in vain; for which Way soever we turn ourselves, wanting the ruling Principle, the Event must be to our Disadvantage. Corruption of Morals will fight against us, when the *French* have neither Fleets nor Armies, our own will be at any Time on Sale to the best Bidder; and instead of conquering the *French*, or beating them out of their Trade, those
who

who have Arms in their Hands, will take a shorter and securer Course, by planting the Points of their Bayonets to our Breasts, and telling us, This is the Reward of our Folly.

It is reported, I know not how truly, that a Lady of the first Rank in the Kingdom, requiring a certain Clergyman to remind her of her Faults; he mentioned one to her; she desired to be still farther informed; he answered, mend that first.

It signifies little to mention all our present Defects, or from what Source they spring; for, unless we be in a Humour to remedy the most important, I see not the Use of proceeding. Do we complain of wanting Vent for Manufactures, and at the same Time neither keep to our Standard in the warmer, nor hinder the importing of the lighter and thinner Kind into our Plantations of foreign Fabrick? Is it of more Significance to us, in Point of domestic Opulence, that the Balance of Trade is against us in *India, China, Turkey, Russia, or France?* except that, the Power of the latter acquired by Trade, is more likely to harm us; but if it be a clear Point, that a virtuous People were never yet conquered, Will it not then depend more upon our Virtue, than our Trade, that we remain unconquered? If, then, we esteem ourselves in any Danger of being conquered by *France*, Do we not pre-suppose the Virtue of the *French*, rather than the Power of *France?* And does this become the Honour of *Englishmen?*

By

By Virtue I more particularly intend here, that just Method of Acting, which suits the Beginning to the End, That whoever deals with me To-day, may do the same To-morrow, and so on, without even the Suspicion of a Fraud. This is commercial Virtue; what else Men do, is no part of my present Enquiry, other than just mentioning, that a Defect of commercial Virtue may be sometimes owing to a Conduct that merits not the highest Commendation; but when the one doth not affect the other, it is not so particularly the public Concern.

It seems pleasant, while on this Subject, to observe, with what Care and Assiduity the *Irish* conduct their Linen Manufactures, with what a scrupulous Exactitude their Marks and Staple are attended to; and how dangerous it is to deviate. The Success has answered their warmest Hopes, and given a fair Prospect of succeeding in Time, to equal the finest Fabricks that ever were thrown in a Loom; and shall we envy the *Irish* herein, or emulously imitate so bright, so shining an Example? We say of those that are born Noble, if they do not behave suitably, they disgrace their Ancestors. Is it not the same in Trade? Our Ancestors are delivered down to us in the same Light, as the *Irish* now appear in; and if we deviate, Are we not a Disgrace to them? I presume this will not be disputed,

Then, if we are not degenerated, the Cause of our Decay of Trade must result from something diffe-

different: This I shall likewise inquire into. It may, perhaps, be from other Nations having interfered in our Manufactures; and thence, that the Quantity that we make, may be in Proportion lessened; and likewise from *India* Imports, and the Alteration of Fashions, there may be more Silks, and less Woollen Goods wore than formerly, both at home and abroad. Now, were we thoroughly clear in this, by an adequate Knowledge of our former and present Exports, and by what is made and worn abroad, more or less than at other Times; this certainly would determine something; it would be a Criterion whereby to form our Judgments, and reduce this Argument to some Degree of Certainty.

To get at this, a farther Consideration is necessary, whether since the Discovery of *America*, and the vast Increase of what is called the Medium of Trade, the Commerce, and consequently the Opulence of most *European* States is in Proportion increased? and as common Experience informs us, that as Wealth flows in, Expence becomes more diffuse, the more People wear and waste. This admitted, may it not from hence be probably conjectured, that the setting up of Woollen Manufactures in other Countries, and ours still perfect in their Kind, that though we cannot have all, yet that we may share in this Increase?

Our Trade with *France*, before the Woollen Manufacture came to any Ripeness there, was considerably

serably more to our Disadvantage than at present, at the Revolution, than now, though the *French* have got the Indigo Trade from us ; nay, I may venture to say, from good Authority, that the Balance is not so high now by Three-fourths ; whence it seems evident, that their Woollen Manufactures have not operated against us at home, however it may have affected us abroad ; nor does any other Nation do much in that Particular ; nor can I think that their Woollen Goods has affected us so much any where, as the Silk Manufacture here has affected the *French* ; because it is apparent, that the Balance against us formerly, resulted from Silks imported from them ; and that Wines, Cambricks, Laces and Toys, bore but a small Share in that great Balance, computed on the Revolution at a *Million Sterling* : yet is there no doubt, that *France* then took from us large Quantities of Woollen Goods, but not nearly equivalent to the Silks we imported thence ; and as neither the *French* now take our Woollen, nor we their Silks, of any Significance, and the Balance long before the Cambrick Act, so much changed in our Favour, I may be allowed to conclude, that the Nation is not the worse for the Interchange ; or in other Words, that we are better by making their Silks, than they by our Woollens, by as much as the Difference of that Balance amounts to, except what they may have gained upon us independently, or at foreign Markets ; but what that may be, is not easily determined.

Calculations upon our own Trade are very difficult, and often fallacious, on the Trade of others still more so. We cannot say where the *French* have the better Woollen Trade, except in *Turky* and *Italy*; in *Germany* and *Russia* we seem to have the Preference; in *Spain*, the *French* may do more; in *Spanish America* it is very doubtful, for Reasons not proper to mention. Our Colonies take vastly more than the *French* Colonies; and I think we have the Main of the Trade to *Portugal*. What is done in the *Indies* by either Nation, does not at present occur to me, but I think ours has improved considerably. The Kind of Goods traded with for Furs in *America*, even those the *French* use, are chiefly *English*.

The general Notion that the *French* work cheaper, however apparent in some Particulars, is very far from being true in all; our Manufacturers complain, and I believe very truly, that the Price at Market is too low for the Hazard; and that, notwithstanding Labourers work cheaper than heretofore, the Masters have little Profit. Had this been previously the Case, we should now have had more Markets than Goods; at present, more Goods than Markets, as those who have formerly become Opulent, will rather make Goods at no Profit, than suffer the little Ones to grow up to them; while such, by their personal Labour and close Application, get something; the others will not permit them

to get much ; the one pushes by Necessity, the other by Wealth ; and both together overload the Market. However, so long as the Industry of the one, can in some Measure balance the Riches of the other, the Consequence must be, a low Market, and the Employment of Numbers ; but at the same Time can be only supported by a Variation in the Fabric ; if it must be cheaper, it must be slighter ; yet is it evident by *London*, the best domestic Market that we have, that we make them either slighter or coarser, or both, but dearer than heretofore ; which should, on this Reasoning, be owing to the Draper, rather than to the Manufacturer. This matters little to the Consumer, however it may respect this Enquiry ; but the Case must vary essentially in foreign Markets, where we have a potent Rival to contend with, and the Consequence obvious ; as a Market for any Commodity is only obtained by Art, Address, and punctual Dealing ; but when lost, almost irretrievable, because the Manufactures sold abroad introduce a Kind of Fashion amongst the People ; and when the Merchants and Dealers have got a Habit of going to this or that Factor, find themselves well used, and suitable Returns, they will not be easily persuaded to risque their Trade on new Projects, especially where they have found themselves sometimes deceived : If, then, Goods were now made better, and sold cheaper, it is labouring up Hill ; but had that been done at first, which ap-
pears

pears absolutely necessary at last, the Market had been saved ; and when a Rival is once effectually beat out, the Price may be gradually raised again.

This is only to be effected where Wealth so abounds, as that a present Loss may be hazarded for a future Gain ; for if a Rival will undersell, and we will not, and such Rival can hold it out, until we, not perceiving the Sap that is to destroy us, have lost the Trade, we cannot justly complain of our Rivals, but of our Selfishness and Stupidity ; it being evident, that which soever can bear Losses longest, must have the Trade to themselves : And this is not only the Case in the *Turky*, but in every other Trade that the *French* rival us in.

The Question then will consist of two Parts, Whether *London* or *Marseilles* was best able to carry on Trade in this Manner ? or which, the *French* or the *English*, have succeeded best in their respective Selfishnesses ?

The Selfishness of the *French* is by carrying on a losing Trade to acquire a Monopoly.

The Selfishness of the *English*, by being terrified at a losing Trade, to give it intirely up.

Thus have the *French* acquired the *Turky* and *Spanish* Trade: they are near doing the same in *Africa* and *China*; and must, in the Event, carry all before them.

What is said of the Merchants, may be said of the Manufacturers, for if they will not, or cannot submit to lose for a Time on this Principle, our Trade must be lost for ever.

In this Case, the *French* have either more Sense, or more national Virtue, or both, and leads us into a plain Enquiry what the *British* Merchants and Manufacturers ought to do for the Service of their Country, as it may seem strange that any one should desire them to engage in a losing Trade. But suppose, before we lose any more Markets, they were to inquire scrupulously into the Bottom of the *French* Traders to particular Markets, what Funds they have, or were likely to acquire on their Credit, what the intrinsic Cost of the Commodities they deal in, and what they gain or lose upon them? and then, as in course, what it would cost us to beat them out, and what the Profit when in our own Hands? This is no new Scheme amongst domestic Dealers: we have seen the *Plate Glass Trade* monopolized by it at home; and is it possible for our Merchants to be more short-sighted, than little domestic Traders? I dare say Mr. *Dawson* never minded losing Ten or Twenty Thousand Pounds

Pounds to keep the Trade in his own Hands; and are the Minds of our Merchants so much narrower, as that they will sooner drop Trade into the Hands of the *French*, than lose something to gain the Whole? If so, the Fate of our Trade is determined; and I cannot think that the Government is under the least Obligation to enter into improper Engagements about it; for tho' it may be, that we could beat the *French* out of their Trade by intercepting their Ships, this would be at best an unfair, and perhaps a very hazardous Undertaking; most probably, very little, if any thing to our Advantage. A Risque of very great Consequence, and totally impolitical, as we should be more likely to bring on us the Resentment of those with whom the *French* trade, than recover that Trade by such indirect Means.

On the other Side, suppose what I have suggested be true, would not the Money thrown away in an improper War contribute more to make us a flourishing People, by being employed in out-trading the *French*? and presuming such Money necessary, would it not be much more honourably engaged, more especially as it has not yet appeared, that our warlike Atchievements ever turned to any Account?

Violence, by the Law of Nature and Nations, is only to be opposed to Violence, Craft to Craft: where

where the Reputation and Honour of the Whole is affronted, there let it be resentd ; but the Interest of Individuals, however it may in some Measure affect the Whole, ought to be considered another Way.

Again, is it strange to propose, that twenty *Manufacturers* having formerly acquired Thirty Thousand Pounds each, and the like Number of *Merchants* the same ; Will it, on a fair Calculation, appear, that each of them bringing Ten Thousand Pounds into a common Stock, and of that lost Ten Thousand Pounds for twenty Years ? supposing they then recovered into their own Hands a Trade after, worth to them Twenty Thousand Pounds a Year, Would not they be great Gainers ? and as the losing of that Ten Thousand Pounds would bring on such a Trade into the Government considerably more, than they lose for the present, and share highly in the future Advantages, Could not the Government indemnify them in Part, or perhaps the Whole, as the Merchant may lose, while both the Government and the Country gain considerably ?

I mention this only as an uncertain Proposition, in respect to the Sum advanced, the present Loss, and future Gain, because that depends most materially on the Resolution and Funds of the *French*, to support a losing Trade ;
but

but it seems very plain, that this is the Scheme by which they have succeeded in the *Turky* Trade, though not on any Thing like so good a Bottom, being ruined one after another for a long Succession of Time; and it is in such Cases that I think *Monopolies* right, and indeed would be never wrong, could we persuade Men not to be too much in a hurry to be rich, at the Expence of their Co-Adventurers, because such Men might adventure what they could conveniently spare; and a large Capital can only support great Hazards, and contend with crafty Adversaries; but as *Monopolies* have not been so well conducted as many reasonably expect, it has produced a general Objection to all, not from *Monopolies* being bad in themselves, but from the Nature of Men entrusted with Property, whom Experience shews do not involve the Interests of others with their own; but on the contrary, often gain by their Losses.

I therefore do not propose a *Monopoly*, but an *Association*; and one Reason why I think such a Thing eligible is, because as no Man can find in his Heart to be satisfied with what he has got, it is suited to that Turn he should be getting more, if it was only for the same Reason that he does not think himself rich enough; for if he is laying up for Posterity, while we are losing our Trade, he is doing little; but in leaving them a flourishing Commerce, is doing better

for them, than by meer dead Money; which, in a State of Idleness, soon vanishes; but in a Course of Industry, improves, and becomes permanent.

It is likewise to be observed, that the Reason many give why they leave off Trade is, that they cannot gain so much by it, as in the public Funds. This is a fatal Stroke upon Trade, and seems at first Sight not only eligible, but reasonable; but still they see but a little Way; for the Government perceiving this, will naturally command their Money on any Terms, and reduce Interest so low as to give them another Turn of Thinking; but this may happen at a Time when Trade is sunk too low, and the Hazard that now is fair, be then only Hazard; and what is still as plain, as our Duties fail for want of Trade, the Funds must sink with it, first Interest, then Principal by Degrees, until it has made its Exit.

Therefore those who are only Men of To-day, rich in Conceit, and hugging themselves in their selfish Wisdom, may, before they are aware, instead of being on firm Ground, find they are on an Island of Ice, off from which they may slip into the Stream, or be carried on it into the Ocean: For if our Funds depend on our Duties, and those who have Wealth lay aside Trade, and that it cannot be carried on without Wealth,

it is I apprehend but too plain, that Wealth, Trade, and the Funds, must all vanish together.

Suppose again; these Gentlemen say, that as we find one Trade not answer, we engage in another. This is very well; but if the same Temperament of Mind continues, what will it amount to more than this, that they are for a little present Profit, beating the Bush, and the *French* running away with the Hare? For can a reasonable Man conclude against Fact and Experience, that the same People who have found the Art of undermining us in 1, 2, 3, &c. will not follow us through; and by this Method of sapping gradually, reduce our Trade to its primitive Nothing.

This is really the *French* Scheme; and had that People been richer than we at the Outset, a Course of this Kind would not equally have reflected on our national Virtue; but as the Fact is, it reflects not only on our Virtue, but on our Skill and Discretion, in just that natural Proportion as they have gain'd upon us by it; and yet the same Men who have suffered this, would take it amiss if they were told, that the *French* surpass them in these excellent Qualities.

There is nothing so plain in Trade as the monopolizing of foreign Markets at any Hazard, at any Price; and it should seem to me, that when

this Hazard runs too high for Individuals, the whole Community should subscribe. On a fair State of the Case, the Government could not object to this, for the Reasons before given; and in as much as every Ship that goes abroad is a Kind of Milch Cow to the State, and in that the Community rests.

That the State is ready, on all proper Occasions, to contribute to the Welfare of Commerce, is evident, amongst other Things, for what they have done for the *British Fishery*. A Trade of little Profit to the Proprietors when well conducted, but much otherwise with bad Management; yet let who will lose, as the Public and the Revenue gain thereby, the State has been very ready to make the Proprietors a suitable Allowance, because it is their Interest, and because they know it: And these are the Kind of Reasons that must always be given, in order to the conducting of a Scheme to a Crisis, whether it respects public, or whether it concerns private Life. But after all, if those who engage are not skilful, or honest, or both, what the Government encourages, will only turn to our Confusion, as Statesmen will be laugh'd at for not judging better of Men: Therefore, when well persuaded, that the Scheme is just, the next Enquiry is, after Men fitted to the Execution, for there are wild-headed Merchants as well as in other Professions, and the most ignorant, the most bold and presuming. What has been done in
the

the *British Fishery*, has been the same on various other Occasions; and the Event may be always judged of by this Test, that it be made a Point that no one shall be employed that understands any thing of the Business, unless by Inspiration; the Conclusion is clear, that the Motives of Action are not calculated for the Purpose publicly pretended, and consequently the Success something more than doubtful.

From our domestic Manufactures, we are next to consider our *Sugar Colonies*, for there the Complaint is the same; that is, the *French* run away with the Trade; but no one is kind enough to inform us of the immense Estates made by the Planters: If then both these Points met together at the same time, in the same Mind, Would it not occasion a very whimsical Perplexity, to discover the occult Cause why, or how Men, by a Decay of Trade, grow Wealthy? *Planters* there, and *Factors* here, while the *French* undersell us at foreign Markets, and our Sugar Trade is come to nothing. But as it is possible, that the Acquisition of less Wealth by Individuals, might in some measure have conduced to the keeping our Ground abroad, so is it reasonable to imagine, that private Gain has so much exceeded public Virtue, as is just equal to the Loss of our Sugar Trade at foreign Markets.

Men may glory in these Acquisitions as much as they please, may affect State, Pomp, and even aim at Nobility, as a due Reward of the Ruin of this Branch of our Commerce. I shall not quarrel with them about the Morality of all this; but on the other side, I would not wish to see Nations engaged in dangerous, destructive, and expensive Wars, on so ridiculous an Account as the Pretence of these Men, that their Trade is ruined by the Interference of the *French*; and Millions be thrown away in *Europe*, to make a few Individuals easy and happy in *America*; or in other Words, Upon what Foundation of Reason is it, that we must mortgage our Estates in *England*, to improve particular Interests abroad, that in a fair Course of Trade, in no Sense answer it? But our Money would be the least Consideration in this Particular, were it to go only where it might be of real Service to the Nation, and from whence it might possibly in due Course of Time return; but the Mischief is, that the Result of these mistaken Complaints sinks it in the *Germanic Ocean*; whence I need not say, 'tis totally irretrievable. I believe when Men first complained of the *French* running away with our Trade, and aim'd at a War to retrieve it, they little dreamt of the Consequence; if their Eyes are open now, 'tis too late, the Die is cast, and the Event in the Hands of Providence. But here it may be observed, as a certain Maxim,

Maxim, that Commerce must flourish by Skill only, never by Fighting. As it would be no small Presumption to say, that we would have the Sea to ourselves; so on the other hand, had we the whole Ocean at command, and our Traders without commercial Virtue, those who must deal with us alone, would soon find some way of extricating themselves from being imposed on, and consequently our Trade soon come to Nothing. What then should we do? fight all the World, and make them submit to be cheated. The Fate of the HANSE TOWNS may be a Warning to us, who attempting to force Trade by Power, instead of Integrity, were suddenly ruin'd; and they who made the greatest Figure, that any commercial People have ever done, are now so contemptible as to be almost unknown.

Our Sugar Island Trade, however advantageous one Branch may, by indirect Practice, apparently seem, is not in the Article of Sugar of any other Advantage to the Nation, than as it contributes to keep at home and to circulate the Riches of the Wealthy and Luxurious, amongst the Manufacturers and Labourers, which is a real Benefit, so long as we can find Wealth to support that Expence; so that this Trade rather makes the industrious Poor happy, than the Nation rich; and as we make Sugar too dear to export, and the Vent is at home, until we can manufacture it cheaper, it

is idle to quarrel with any of our Neighbours on this Head, either concerning what Sugar they vend, or how far they extend their Plantations ; it may concern some Individuals, but ought not to interest the Nation, as it depends on such Individuals only to rectify the Error.

It is not many Years since that the *Jamaica* People destroyed their Plantations of *Indigo* and *Anatto*, as advantageous Commodities at least as any their Parent Country produces, and which the *Spaniards* had cultivated with great Care and Industry ; but the *English*, becoming the Heirs of their Sagacity, found that Estates were not to be thereby suddenly obtained. Hence it happened, that rather than be satisfied with moderate Gain, they threw the Commodities back into the Hands of the *Spaniards*, from whom the *French* have since in Part obtained the Trade, and, until of late, have principally supplied the *English* Market. But since, and to the eternal Disgrace of those who first threw it up, *Indigo* is found worth raising even in CAROLINA.

In the permitting of this Conduct amongst the Planters, the Government was certainly short-sighted, as all must be esteem'd, who suffer the Tricks and Projects of Individuals to ruin any Branch of Commerce. This is a Point well attended to by the Counsels of *France*, and the Effects but too evident. Our Acts of Parliament

liament are full as forcible as *French* Edicts, tho' not perhaps always so clear, speedy, and instantaneously decisive, or put in Execution; but we have a Method much more natural and agreeable to a free People, than *Edicts*, *Acts*, or any Kind of Enforcements simply considered can amount to; that is, out of the public Stock, to give such Encouragement as may invite the most Covetous or Venal to engage in the Undertaking. This is certainly the Way to raise and establish Colonies, which, like the Flower in a frosty Morning, wanting the genial Influence, are nipt, and perish in the Bud.

This Kind of Encouragement suits better with Reason and common Sense, than on every Emergency going to War with our Neighbours, because they improve, and we decay in Trade, and perhaps the Fact not clearly understood neither; but while it is the Part of designing Men to rave at they hardly know what, it is the Concern of a Ministry to studiously examine into the Cause of Complaint; if just, to remedy it as speedily as possible; if otherwise, skilfully to impede its Course, least it spread amongst the Multitude, who never reason for themselves, and becomes so like Truth, that every body believes it; and however false, has more than once precipitated Ministers into very disagreeable Measures. In a free State, there is no standing against the universal Cry of a Nation, though the Cause,
duly

duly weigh'd and examined, has no manner of Foundation, but in the Brains of artful Incendiaries; which leads us to consider, What is the true Cause of the present War, or kind of War, now in Agitation?

The last War I think had its Origin in a real or supposititious Notion, that the *Spaniards* took, plundered, or searched our Shipping, to the Detriment of our Trade, which the Government is doubtless obliged to protect, if it was for no other Reason, than because Trade supports the Government. This is so far true Reasoning; and it further concerns a Nation to be jealous of its Honour, even in Trifles; this the Complaint of every idle Fellow is not to bring in Question, but it happened, that a Patriot War, which cost us, I dare not say what, evidently added near Thirty Millions to the public Debt, was founded upon little more than JENKINS's losing his Ears, who, by the way, did not lose them, nor was there a Man in the whole House of Commons, but what took this fact of his losing his Ears so much for granted, that they never examined whether he lost them or not; and yet, upon this single Fact, the Question materially turned, Whether or not there should be a War? which, however, was at last determined in favour of the *Ears*.

I hope the present War has some better Grounds, and that we are not now fighting for a Pair of Ears which were never lost.

The Fact I think is plainly this; the *Americans* complain, that the *French* encroach upon them, build Forts on our real, or supposed Territory, and by themselves, or *Indians* armed, or both together, attack our Colonies, destroy our People; and if not impeded by a speedy Assistance from GREAT BRITAIN, will soon drive them all into the Sea. Hereupon we send over Troops, and commence a War, acting offensively by Sea and Land; while the *Americans* at the same time boast, that they are twenty to one in Number more than the *French*, and have the Odds in Point of Courage. Hence results a Matter of reasoning how it can be, that the *Americans* are so situate, and yet want Assistance. It is argued by some, that they want Money; but this is still more absurd. Their Militia is what they chuse wisely to depend upon; and how Money can be wanted for these, is mysterious, as every Man either goes in Person, or hires one in his stead, and is equally to provide Subsistence for himself, or another. But if the *French* are so powerful as to be able to drive them into the Sea, then all must fight in their own Defence, and none left to be hired; but supposing them all hired Men, either those who employ should be able to pay, or go themselves; for if the pub-

lic Money is to do it, then are they no longer Militia, but Mercenaries. This I mention by the way, much wishing, that our Money be never worse employed; but then the whole System is upon an improper Footing: They should have been, in this Light, long before supplied with Money, if that would have been the means of their Preservation, they might have then attack'd the *French* in their own way, and *Great Britain* remain'd unconcerned; but as it stands now, many Millions are expended about an Affair, that a quarter of one would, according to appearances, have put an End to, and is likely besides to throw all *Europe* into a Flame. This, as it respects the *Welfare* of GREAT BRITAIN, seems not very happy Conduct; but where the main Error rests, is Matter of a different Enquiry.

There might possibly be Reasons of State, obliging us for a certain Period, to permit the *French* to act as they thought proper in *America*, that being generally unknown, can't here be reasoned upon; but if that was ever the Case, the *French* have been too hard for us, doing their Business at a small Expence, while ours is immense. The *French* on this Principle can afford to let us take all their Merchant Ships without Opposition, and yet ruin us by the Expence. The Court of *France* may pay the Merchants all their Losses, and yet expend some Millions Sterling less than we; how this may end at last,

turns

turns upon another Question, Whether we can, with an open Trade, better bear the Expence, or *France*, with an interrupted Trade, the Losses? or, if we go on in the Manner we now do, which will be ruin'd first?

This requires another Examination; In what Condition are the Finances of the respective Powers? it has been often canvass'd, and the Argument in some respect impossible to be determined. We don't know the Resources of *France*; for we really don't know our own; nor can the *French* possibly determine the Extent of their Abilities. We may, either of us, be in the State of a great Trader, neglecting his Accounts, and either become Bankrupts before we are aware. The Appearance of Wealth is certainly in favour of GREAT BRITAIN, but how generous the People of either Nation would be to their Government on the last Emergency, when a Kind of political Consumption has wasted away the Lungs of the State, is not in the Power of Man to determine. An *Edict* in FRANCE can do no more than an *Act of Parliament* in ENGLAND, and very questionable whether so well obeyed, in which our Hopes trust much, should ever the fatal Day of Tryal come.

On the Continent of AMERICA, it is probable, that the Expence of *France* at present, is more

than of ENGLAND; and were we only to contend with the *French* there, the Balance would be greatly in our favour; as then expensive Alliances, large Fleets, and new raised Armies, would be out of the Question, as would the transporting of Troops, &c. be totally unnecessary. The *French*, would they balance with us in *America*, must send *European* Troops, and many too, to be on a Parity with the Colony of NEW ENGLAND only. The Expence of these, in Transportation, &c. would throw the Distress mainly on the Side of FRANCE; it would cost that Court more in that single Article, than all our Expence in the support of *America*, and Maintenance of the *New England* Mercenaries; the Expenditure on the Spot, still more in disfavour of FRANCE; and as the Country of CANADA, &c. is not sufficiently plentiful to supply a large additional Number of People, and as the Risque of Provisions thither is great, so will the Price be, not avoidable by any Artifice of Power, nor can the Policy of State in any Sense prevent it; for even supposing those due Precautions taken, which the Sagacity, Wisdom and Foresight of that Court are very capable of, to stock the Country with cured and barrel'd Provisions of all Kinds, wet and dry; the Chance of one Year would in effect destroy the most Part, and therefore a constant Supply always necessary, which at best is but precarious, very expensive, and

and oftentimes, very fatal to the poor Wretches, whose Dependence is wholly thereon.

There is another Consideration extremely necessary to be put in the Balance; It is, that the Climates of FRANCE and CANADA are very different, which the Wealthy and Hardened well enough support; while the poor Soldier, that lives at best on humble Fare, and that the Major Part of the Year must dine on a small Allowance of bad salt Provisions, destitute of Vegetables, to which they are so much accustomed; and that, in every other Respect, feels all the Hardships of an unfriendly Air, pinched with its Severity without, and a craving Appetite within, irritated and heightened by the sharp inclement Air, must feel the fatal Effects; and, without a very happy Constitution, fall a Sacrifice; that it happens so to many, is in the Nature and Reason of Things hardly to be doubted, was not it confirmed by good Authority. The recruiting of these still increases the Expence, and poises weightily in the Scale of Comparisons; and as it is evident, that the *New England* Militia are not subject to any of these Inconveniences, nor in course of the Consequences resulting therefrom; the Advantage on our Part is so evident, as not to need any further Illustration.

It may be the Wisdom of some Readers to observe, that I have omitted two Points necessary to be thrown in the Balance on the behalf of *France*; the one is, that we have been at the Expence of transporting Troops into *America* as well as the *French*; and that the Natives are vastly more numerous in the *French* Service than in ours.

As to the former, our transporting of Troops into *America*, I am not reasoning from what is done, but from what is evidently right to do; and therefore have only further to say, that if the Government sent those Troops only to take a Fort on the *Ohio*, it would have but ill answered the Expence had they succeeded; it is even better now in that respect, than if they had, as they have fewer Officers and Men to maintain than heretofore; I think it is said by one-half; But the Wisdom and Sagacity of our Ministry had certainly further Views, no doubt the Conquest of, and driving the *French* from the most remote Banks of the *Mississippi*, as the only Means of securing the Frontiers of *VIRGINIA*; and as this was possible under wise Conduct, therefore not unreasonable to imagine it was intended; but as we had but one Officer in the *English* Army who had seen any thing of the Manner of Fighting in *America*, and him not employed; and as Courage was but a small Part
of

of a Commander's necessary Qualification in this Service, it happened a little unluckily that our Troops were defeated, our Reputation injured, and our Expence in vain. But it follows not from hence that there was a Necessity of sending any Troops, because, as the *Americans* hold, not in any Sense wanted; on the contrary, without sending Troops, perhaps the *French* could not support themselves in that Country; so that, however Matters have been conducted, it hurts not my Argument, though it amounts at present to something in the Balance in favour of *France*.

As to the Number of *Indians* engaged in the Interest of either Nation, it is very difficult to say which way the Balance inclines; it should be in the Nature and Reason of Things, much in favour of *France*, as their Priests and People are extremely industrious to engage them in their Service; and to the same Purpose are their Governors and Commanders very complaisant and obliging; besides that, the *French* by dispersing themselves about in Forts, and their Rangers being much amongst them; if any thing could fix an *Indian* Nation firmly in their Interest, it seems almost certain that their Measures would effect it; but it happens with the *Indians* as with poor People in general, that they are only attach'd to those who feed, cloath, and protect them,

them, and no longer than they do so. These are Sentiments which Poverty ever dictates, resulting from the Nature and Necessity of Things; the Poor do not chuse to starve with the Unfortunate; therefore whoever possesses the Vicinage of these wild People, and can apparently protect them, which they cunningly enquire, to whom, and to them only, are they attached; and it will, I doubt not, appear, that the Defeat on the *Ohio* on the one Side, and the Success of General *Johnson* on the other, has made suitable Alterations in the Conduct of the *Indians*, although nothing permanent can from either of these Actions be presently determined.

It is thus I answer such Criticisms or Enquiries as may, on these Occasions, occur; and thus the capital Problem in View becomes easy to solve. We see it consists of two Parts, equally tending to an Inquisition into the *Welfare* and *Prosperity* of GREAT BRITAIN, whether we can carry on the War with FRANCE in AMERICA with evident Advantage on our Side, or in EUROPE, but with the same Advantage on the Part of France? Whence results a third Question, Whether the War can be carried on in *America*, without enflaming *Europe*? And lastly, What are the best Measures for *Great Britain* to pursue, our present Situation considered?

It seems to me evident, that if no *British* Troops are required to defend *America*, and the
Ame-

Americans only require a moderate Sum of Money, and will on that Footing in earnest pursue the Expulsion, or Destruction of the *French*. That a War there is the most eligible of any that we have any where, or at any time engaged in, as it may be carried on perhaps at as little Expence as a *Russian Subsidy*, but with a very different Kind of Profit: Not that I quarrel with Subsidies, I only mean to shew what is the Difference. It is said, that the *French* have transported six thousand Troops into *America*; I must confess I doubt the Fact; but if they should transport as many as they may want there, if we know when we are in earnest, that Expence alone will be equal to any Charge we need be at in support of our *American Colonies*; nor need any timorous Statesman dread the Consequence of expelling the *French*, as if it would make the *Americans* forget themselves and run retrograde. The natural Consequence appears to me in a different Light, for the more Land they have free from the Annoyance of bad Neighbours, the more they will be disunited and dispersed, suppose any evil Intention, which, without some Cause, is not to be presumed. But more than that, it is not practicable, as I could easily evince, were I not digressing from my Subject. There is one Point, however, very obvious, that until their native Commodities are superior, or at least equal, to the Produce of *Norway*, *Russia*, and *Sweden*, it should seem, that must al-

ways depend upon *England* for a Market, and consequently are bound to us by an Obligation, almost as strong as a mild and just Government: Both which they thoroughly understand, and are not therefore to be suspected, much less questioned on that Head. And as it is plain, that if we must contend with *France*, our Strength and Advantage lies here, it is equally plain, that here ought to be our main Expence.

In EUROPE, as Matters appear at present, our Ministry, by Art, or Accident, or both, seem to have over-reached the *French* Court, but whether upon Terms that we can support, is a Question not so easily determined, as many at first Sight conceive; of whom, taking either Side of the Argument, their Conclusions are more ready, than their Conceptions just. There are only two Ways of ascertaining this; the one, a true Balance of what we gain by Trade, and what we adventure abroad in Armies, Subsidies, and such like; the other is, a clear Knowledge of the national Stock; but how either of these are to be come at, is as mysterious to me, as how any Determination can be made without it.

Political Calculations, like many other serious Whims of the Ingenious, are very pretty Amusements; and as it is a Point that I have practically considered, with my best Attention, I think I may venture safely to say, are not in any
Sense

Sense to be depended upon : nor unless the Possessors would give in an Account of their personal, as in *King William's* Time they did of their real Estates, can it possibly be come at; and then we should only know we had so much, but how much more, would be still as uncertain, as few would be vain or weak enough to give in a full or Over-Value, but many much less; so it happened in respect to the real, so it would in the personal Estates, in the common Sense of Things, as no Man, in his right Mind, submits with Pleasure to a Tax upon Industry, too much the Canker-worm of a State, to be encouraged by Men even of moderate Discernment, and who have the pungent Sense of Feeling: It follows hence, that though we can't determine, we can feel; and if we can't calculate to a Minuteness when the Day of Doom will happen, we can readily determine, from the poising of our Purse, the Difference between Levity and Gravity, and thence conclude what Weight of Industry is abroad a Fortune hunting.

Some imagine that the *French* have the Advantage of us in this Particular; and some *Frenchmen* are foolish enough to brag, that their King knows, to a Nicety, the Depths of his Subjects Purse; consequently can form a true Judgment how far the State may venture to engage in political Altercation. But as it is a real Truth, that neither are the Finances in *France*

so well established as ours, nor will the People of common Sense in that Country, more than in any other, freely open their Arms to embrace, or hold out their Shoulders to receive, a Burthen; from which, and various other occurring Circumstances, I may venture to conclude, that the Resources of *France* are as difficult to ascertain as those of *Great Britain*, and I believe something more.

If we enquire into the current Revenues of either State, and whence the occasional Extraordinaries are gathered, it will be perhaps more a Question at last, how much is applied to the public Service, than how much is plunder'd from the People. In which Light I must do my own Country the Justice to say, that as our Finances are under a much better Oeconomy than those of *France*, so I hope that they are better applied too; for although a certain Rabblement of Locusts devour the Industry of the People, yet they equal not one rapacious Minister union'd with the Revenue-Farmers of *France*, that at once wreck the Community and impoverish the State. Hence it is not so material what *France* is worth, as what the State out of that Value gathers. The same may be said of *Great Britain*; and this Way only are we to form a Balance, or conclude which will first die of a Political Consumption.

It is certain, that Fleets are vastly more expensive than Armies, in Proportion to the Number of Men, as the Difference of the Value of Provisions amount to; the Contingencies of the Army being nearly as much as the Expence of Shipping. The *French* Armies are said to be maintained cheaper than ours; and when successful, are paid out of the Revenues of the conquered Provinces. As this can never be the Case of a *British* Fleet, where the Acquisitions are meerly casual, and invested in the Captors; so the Difference between our keeping up a grand Fleet, and the *French* a grand Army, is very material, in Point of Expence, and is to be essentially attended to before we strike a Balance. A *French* Foot Soldier has little more than the fourth Part of a *British* Seaman's Pay; and the Value of a Seaman's Provisions is nearly equal to his Pay; so that one Seaman in *England* is much the same Expence to the State, as six, or perhaps seven Foot Soldiers in *France*. But this Observation must be considered with various Allowances, as the foreign Troops in the Service of *France*, the *Swiss* and *Irish*, have higher Pay; and though considerably dearer, are courted in Preference to the Natives; and being always readily received, make perhaps better than a fourth Part of the whole *French* Army; and when the Horse are added, the Expence is proportionably augmented. Hence it should seem, that
so

so far as the foreign Troops in the Service of *France* extend, the Expence is equal to that of the *British* Soldiery, nearly the Expence of five Soldiers to two Seamen; but including the Horse and Dragoons, as four is to two: As to the other three-fourths of the *French* Army, whether they will balance our national and subsidial Troops, making up by their Numbers, what they are defective in Pay, can only be ascertain'd by knowing what subsidial Troops are to be employed, and for what Length of Time; it being evident, that when such are not engaged, and only ten thousand *British* Seamen employed, with our national Troops, as customary, that the Balance is vastly against *France*, but not so in our present Situation; it being very clear that our subsidial Expences, in prospect, are much too large for the Comparison; and as the *French* augment but little in Time of War, having standing Forces nearly to answer their Purpose, the Addition being principally in their naval Expenditure, and in those Requisites which the March of Armies make necessary, and so far as these extend, make a farther Article in the common Balance. As there is no reducing of this Point to a Certainty, may we not, by a vague Kind of Calculation, say, that as the natural Frugality of the *French*, and the Extravagance of the *English*, evinces at once a different Flow of Wealth and Management in private Life; so it is probable, that this frugal Turn may so affect

fect the *French* Ministry, as naturally to lead them into an Enquiry what Expence each Nation can bear, and conduct themselves accordingly : They will assuredly find that *England* has most Wealth, and infinitely more Expences too, in Proportion to their Views, or to balance their Accounts by ; as the *French* pursue Acquisition, and obtain the Means thereby of paying their Armies, without drawing upon the national Stock ; while the *English* are either meerly on the defensive, or making Acquisitions for those, who instead of saving to, call upon our national Stock for Support ; so that at home, or abroad, in Peace or in War, it is much the same to *Great Britain* ; and the Wealth we can't, with all the Luxury and Extravagance of the Age, expend on ourselves, we very kindly transmit to our Neighbours ; and this some *British* Ministries have affected from a moral Principle, which they learnt in their younger Days from the *New Testament* ; which is, *To love our Neighbours as ourselves* ; but they have improved on this Thought, and taught the *English* to love some People better than themselves ; and by supporting perhaps five hundred Pensioners, made a Million of Beggars ; so that we have not always been able to judge of our Wealth by Appearances ; for so long as any remains, a certain Number of the Elect will shine and flutter in this terestrial Elysium, while infinite Numbers appear in a reverse State ; and the Accumulation so narrowed, that some, perhaps

haps not without Reason, doubt whether the People are richer now, or in the Days of *William* the Conqueror.

In *France* it is rather worse; and the more so, as what is done here by Art, is there effected by Violence. You see there but few wealthy, but those immensely so; and Wealth and Poverty, Magnificence and Rags, so curiously intermix'd and disposed, that it is like passing through an Hospital to come at a Palace. The Merchants perhaps have more Value than they chuse to own, or display in external Ornament, laying up to purchase Nobility for their Sons, chiefly to put them out of the Road of being so conveniently plundered by the Farmers of the Revenue.

Hence springs an Inconvenience to which both Nations are equally subject, and both soon to feel the unhappy Effects. This is a mortgaged Revenue, idly presumed the Peoples Safety, but in truth, the Milch Cow of the *Jews*, of Foreigners, and of those who are *Jews* in Nature, if not by Profession. The *English* have, or have had, better Credit than the *French*; but as Money in both Nations is to be gathered from those who have it to spare, and chuse to lend it, they are now within so narrow a Compass as to command either State, and set what Value on Money they please; and then, as to this Account

count between the two Nations, it will only depend on which can get it cheapest.

The *French* have terrified the Lenders, by annihilating of Millions; and the *English* done something like it, by lowering of the Interest: Whoever advised this last Measure, did not see far before him, or the Necessity there would be of borrowing again; the Presumption might be, that it would be a Means of discharging the public Debts; and so far as it extended, he was not much out in his Divination; but then, as the Necessity of a War with *France*, or a Peace, like a War, must be eternal, so must the Debts increase or diminish in Proportion to the Credit of the Nation. A Man is little likely that is always at Law to clear a mortgaged Estate, or to borrow farther upon it on equal Terms, who has arbitrarily varied from his original Contract. In this Particular we have as much the Advantage of the *French*, as the Difference between Annihilation and lowering of Interest amounts to; this, in Opinion, for perhaps the Difference may not be great between annihilating Part of a Stock and continuing the Interest on the Residue, or lowering the Interest and continuing the Stock intire; but neither strictly right, if only respecting the probable Consequences; for as no body takes our money'd Men to be Fools in Matters respecting Money, so we must conclude, that such as have had their Interest lowered upon

H

them,

them, will now consider their Right to amends ; if not, I shall conclude against common Opinion, that such Men prefer the Love of their Country to the Acquisition of Wealth :—A Conclusion never before imagined, where *Jews*, and Judaic Christians flourished. In *Old Rome* something of that Kind might have occurred, but it was preceding the Times that the *Jews* intermix'd with the *Romans* ; and such an Instance happened in *England*, but I think it was before *Cromwell* sent for the *Jews* over. After which, nothing of this Kind has presented, nor have I any Conception that it ever will. What only now remains to be effected is, to hire these *Jews* to draw in their foreign Friends, which, no doubt, on proper Terms, they will readily attempt.

The *French* may adapt the same Thought ; but they can't equally succeed ; as our Credit, however diminished, is really better than theirs. However, a successful Campaign will keep them on their Legs ; and they will raise in the conquered Provinces what none would lend them on moderate Terms : And if, on the contrary, they prove unsuccessful, they understand best of any People in the World how to fool their Neighbours into a Peace. Thus, if they can't raise Money so easy as the *English*, they have the Means before them of acquiring it cheaper, or of not wanting it.

To sum up the whole Substance of this Discourse in a narrow Compass, that what the Reader loses in the Perusal, he may be recollected in the Conclusion. We see, that unless the *English* are more just to themselves, by an Exactitude of Conduct in their Dealings abroad, or will not labour as cheap as other People, the *French* will have the Advantage in Trade; and the State ought not to enter into a War on that Account, nor for the sake of enriching the Sugar Planters, nor for any Reason that meerly concerns the private Interest of Individuals.

That a War in *Europe* is certainly to the Advantage of the *French*, as in *America* to the *English*, because of the different Power and Expence in the respective Countries.

That a trading Nation must rise to Fame by Industry and Emulation, not by War.

That the Silk Trade brought hither, is of more Importance to us, than the Woollen acquired by *France*, is to that Nation.

That the Loss to *France*, while we take their Shipping, is not equal to our Expence in taking them.

That the *American* War is more expensive to *France* than to *Great Britain*.

The War in *Europe*, more expensive to *Great Britain* than to *France*.

It is some Disadvantage to us in the present Dispute, that our Sovereign has foreign Dominions independent of his regal Dignity, which may be attack'd, though totally unconcerned in the Argument ; and as such Dominions lie fairer to the Enemy, than *Great Britain*, or any of its Dependencies, it is thought will be attack'd, if a proper Force is not drawn thither to defend it; which, as some say, is the Reason why the *Russian* Auxiliaries are engaged : The Support of which Troops, no doubt, contribute essentially to balance the Expence between us and *France*.

It is difficult to say, on certain Occasions, what is right, and what wrong ; whether, if the *French* did not turn their Arms towards *Hanover*, they might not have attempted *England*, and made that the Seat of War, or which Way they will steer to extricate themselves from their present Dilemma, is uncertain : But it seems strange to a Novice, in these Matters, that all our *German* Allies, with the KING of PRUSSIA at their Head, are not sufficient to defend that Electorate ; and if it be made defensible, whether there may not be another Use for the *Russians*.

There is a foolish Secret whisper'd about, as if his Majesty of PRUSSIA was to have certain Dominions

minions in *Flanders*; but that the *French* not approving of him for a Neighbour, they are only to be obtained by Force; if this be so, and his Majesty has not an Army strong enough to carry his Point, no doubt but Auxiliaries may be requisite, and HANOVER, at the same time, preserved.

There seems to me no doubt, that if HANOVER be attack'd by FRANCE, on Account of our general Conduct in *America*, and on the Ocean, but that we are bound in Honour to defend it as far as we are able; because, had not the King consented to this flying War, his electoral Dominions had not been in danger. In common Life, this Argument is very plain; if a Man, not finding Means to revenge himself of me, who have injured him, turns his Vengeance on my Father, Brother, or Friend, I am surely bound in Honour to use every Means in my Power to defend and protect him; and it will not in this Case be presumed, but what is right in private, is the same in public Life.

But as some question this being a fair State of the Fact in every respect, though so far admitted, I will state it according to their own Suggestions, as this materially regards my Enquiry into the probable Expences of FRANCE and GREAT BRITAIN; that suppose the *Russian* Troops eventually intended to establish his *Prussian* Majesty in *Flanders*,

ders, whether that is not as much to the Purpose as the Defence of *Hanover*, and still better, as both Purposes may be served at the same time, and a much better Barrier obtained against *France* on that Side, than the *House* of AUSTRIA and the DUTCH seem willing or capable to maintain. If this be admitted, as politically just, it remains only to enquire how far it suits our Ability; because if we reduce ourselves too low, it may be dangerous. How to determine this absolutely, I must confess, is beyond my present Conception; but as the Expence is fix'd, I doubt not but the Means of Acquisition is known; and this being admitted, as seeming probable, I have only to observe, that if a Barrier of that Consequence can be obtained in *Flanders* by this bold political Push, it may be the saving of many Millions to our Posterity, as so rising a Family as that of *Prussia* will never suffer the Troops of *France* to move farther that Way; and if we can at the same time utterly destroy the *French* Trade, I see not how Troops can be any way maintained to the Prejudice of their Neighbours. I shall, therefore, having perhaps said already more than becomes me, conclude the main Argument by the following loose Calculation.

To

A Calculation of the Proportion of Expence in certain Particulars between GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE in EUROPE.

To 120,000 Landmen in the Service of Great Britain, at 12 d. a Day, for one Year, including Officers	} £.	2,190,000
— — — — —		

To 40,000 Seamen, at 4 l. a Man a Month	} £.	2,080,000
— — — — —		

4,270,000

3,291,250

978,750

To the Maintenance of 250,000 Landmen by France, at 8 d. a Day each Man, which includes Officers Pay, for one Year	} £.	2,901,000
— — — — —		

To ten thousand Seamen, at 3 l. a Man a Month, 13 Months to the Year	} £.	390,250
— — — — —		

3,291,250

N. B. In the State of this Account, there is not included on either Part the Contingencies of the Army, as warlike Stores, Transports, Land-Carriage, &c. nor the Naval Contingencies, as Building, Repairing, Charge of the Ordinary, &c. as the same cannot be so nearly ascertained by any known or settled Rules. The above is sufficient to give the Reader an Idea where the greatest Expence of an *European War* rests; and had I gone farther, perhaps I might have been thought blameable, by those who chuse not to have the Public know upon what unequal Terms we engage in this Part of the World; so that I shall, in the next Place, consider how we stand, by a like Kind of Calculation, in *AMERICA*.

*A like Calculation of the Expences of GREAT
BRITAIN and FRANCE in AMERICA.*

It is to be observed, that I calculate here, not what Expence each are at, but what only there is an absolute Necessity of their being at respectively, as it is not possible to say what Expence, extravagant or wrong Measures may produce on either Part: My Measure of Computation is this; I suppose, that each Party is to have ten thousand Men in Pay, that all the *English* are Militia, and that six thousand of the *French* are regular Troops from *France*. I suppose farther, that half the *New England* Militia are maintain'd at the Expence of the State, the other half by the Colonies; that the *French* Regulars have both Pay and Provisions at the Expence of the State, and are transported into *America* at the same Expence; and that four thousand *French* Militia are maintain'd by the Colony. I must farther observe, that as the Pay of the *French* Regulars is considerably advanced on their going abroad, my Calculation must be proportionably higher than before.

To

To the Pay and Provisions of 6000 Men for one Year, at one Shilling and Sixpence Sterling each in- cluding Officers Pay — —	}	154,250
--	---	---------

To transporting 6000 Men, at forty Shillings a Head — — —	}	12,000
--	---	--------

166,250

To 5000 <i>New England</i> Militia, at one Shilling and Six-pence a Day each — — — —	}	136,875
--	---	---------

Balance in favour of <i>Great Britain</i> — — —	}	29,375
---	---	--------

In this, as in the former, various Contingencies are avoided, as being casual and uncertain, but usually swell the Account considerably; and a small Army is given as the Means of calculating the Expence of a greater; when the Balance against *France* will rise in Proportion to the Increase, and much more so than appears here, as *Canada* has not, like *New England*, Plenty of Provisions for additional Numbers, nor are the Roads equally convenient for Carriages between the Latitude of 50 and 48, as from the Southward to the latter, except in Mid-winter; nor is the Convenience equal of coming at Military Stores, so long as we command the Sea, as the Difference will not only be in Freight, but in Insurance also.

These, amongst many other, are the common Advantages in favour of an *American*, instead of an *European* War; and therefore, if Expence should be the only Point in Question, infinitely to be preferred.

That this is really the most material Point, will be but too apparent when we come to consider, that whether the Balance be for or against *France* in an *European* War, the Expence perhaps may fall be what we can't conveniently bear; which, though it may have the same Effect in *France*, yet may not be attended with like Consequences; for as we know not what internal Enemies we have, it would be an Error to increase them, by making it indifferent to many under what Constitution they live. In *France*, nothing of this kind is likely to occur, where the People *harve, sing, dance, and are content*; the Honour of their King is to them *eat, Drink, and Cloath*; but whether we live in a colder Climate, or not so content with Poverty, or that a certain *Yermin* are tacitly permitted to contaminate the Minds of the People; we seem not quite so happy and united as the *French*, and therefore not on a Level with them, not equally calculated to bear the weight of Distress. Wealth at present, is the only Mark of Distinction amongst us; when that fails, the strongest Party will govern; and who is not aware that this is the Multitude?